By Michael Giometti-
C.S. Lewis in Mere Christianity describes the derivative nature of evil and error. He points out that, since evil/error represents a twisting of something good, it is not a separate thing and thus always retains something of the virtuous:
I do mean that wickedness, when you examine it, turns out to be the pursuit of
some good in the wrong way. You can be good for the mere sake of goodness: you
cannot be bad for the mere sake of badness. You can do a kind action when you
are not feeling kind and when it gives you no pleasure, simply because kindness
is right; but no one ever did a cruel action simply because cruelty is
wrong—only because cruelty was pleasant or useful to him. In other words badness cannot succeed even in being bad in the same way in which goodness is good. Goodness is, so to speak, itself: badness is only spoiled goodness. (p. 44,
2001)
The statists in Congress bent on further socializing our health care system are not immune to this fundamental law, but they are struggling mightily against it. For a long time now, whenever federal politicians have been asked to justify constitutionally their unconstitutional actions, they have given one of two responses. The increasingly popular one, illustrative of the progressive dulling of our political sensibilities, is to dismiss the question as entirely irrelevant (constiwhat?, constiwho?). The more quaint, traditional dodge has been to at least proffer some offhand (though erroneous) boilerplate appealing to the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution. Both cases illustrate Lewis’s maxim, and on more than one level.
Both of these techniques have been employed in the current health care debate. In fact, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has indulged in each herself. When asked to justify constitutionally the House health care bill, she simply dismissed the question entirely by saying, “Are you serious? Are you serious?” When pressed, her office fell back on the traditional dodge in the form of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Never mind that the sole intent of this provision was to facilitate the flow of goods across state borders. Unfortunately, since the late nineteenth century, it has been used to rationalize federal control over just about any type of activity you can think of.
When posed the same question with regard to the Senate bill, Senator Roland Burris was game from the get-go. He struggled manfully with the question and came up with this gem of extemporaneous constitutional reasoning:
Well, that’s under certainly the laws of the -- protect the health, welfare of
the country. That’s under the Constitution. We’re not even dealing with any
constitutionality here. Should we move in that direction? What does the
Constitution say? To provide for the health, welfare and the defense of the
country.
When notified that the Constitution says nothing about health, the Senator’s office later clarified his remarks by saying that he was actually referring to the General Welfare Clause. I suppose he can be excused for the lapse. Who can be expected to know much about the constitution after receiving an undergraduate degree in political science, a J.D., and an L.L.M.--or after spending a quarter-century in government?
Now notice what Burris has done here. In appealing to the General Welfare Clause, he is subscribing to that widespread, and mistaken, notion that it was meant to be a blank-check provision for anything that federal politicians think might be useful at any particular time. By way of assuring skeptics during the ratification debates, however, even the most ardent supporters of a strong national government, such as James Madison, “Father” of the Constitution, maintained that this clause did not grant any powers in addition to the ones enumerated in Article I, Section 8. Madison and the other proponents of the new constitution, at least at that time, considered the clause a summary of or caption to these enumerated powers and not a separate grant of power. The real, and universally recognized, import of this caption was that the powers listed beneath it were to be exercised in a way so as to benefit the nation as a whole and not one state at the expense of the rest.
So, Burris makes his first mistake by looking to the General Welfare Clause instead of those enumerated powers for overall justification of this bill. It’s not surprising to see statists do this since that severely limited list of powers doesn’t include one authorizing the implementation of a health care program (or much else, for that matter). But even if, for the sake of argument, we did assume a constitutional warrant, say under the General Welfare Clause, for nationalized health care, we notice that the statists with their current bill still run afoul of the constitution. This time, though, they do so, ironically enough, by abrogating the General Welfare Clause, with its requirement of non-partiality. For you see, in order to assure passage, Senate Majority Leader Reid has worked out deals, or “compromises” as he calls them, with Hawaii, Massachusetts, Vermont, Louisiana, and, most publicly, Nebraska, which accord these states considerable special favors.
Now, getting back to Lewis’s point, it’s right and laudable for legislators to try to justify their actions constitutionally. The speciousness of any of these attempted justifications represents a falling away, and an example of evil, of error. Nevertheless, no matter how tortured or ironic a rationalization may be, more than a kernel of right-mindedness remains. In this way, Burris and Pelosi 1 are better than Pelosi 2, who dispenses entirely with the need to even try to adhere to this most important of legal standards.
On a more abstract level, though, Burris and Pelosis 1 & 2 make the same mistake--and exhibit the same virtue. They both appeal, correctly, to the moral right of the Needy to receive help, and the moral obligation of the Able to provide help. And, in so doing, I don’t think that we can entirely discount a certain amount of genuine altruism on their part--and certainly not on the part of a lot of their supporters. In this way, we again see a residue of right-mindedness.
Where they fall away, though, in this respect, is when they confuse moral right with legal right, and moral obligation with legal obligation--important distinctions in a free society.
What they need to understand, and what we must continually remind ourselves, is that humans are made to live in an environment of freedom, with a minimum of coercion. In the final analysis, as a result of what happens in that realm of freedom--whether, for example, we act as benefactors or beneficiaries with regard to others--we are edified and help bring out the best in ourselves and others. We also bring about the best of all possible worlds--though not a heaven to be sure.
When we lose sight of this truth, when we lose faith in ourselves or others, when we seek to shirk the responsibility to live fully and grow in this daunting world and instead opt for some ersatz utopia, we relinquish our birthright as free humans and all that goes with it. It is comforting at this time of year and at this moment of in our history, however, to remember Lewis’s words and keep in mind that no matter how far down the road of error we go, we carry a seed of truth and virtue with us that continually, at the very least, beckons forth the best from us.